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reality to the fiction depending on their own engrossment and/or 
the suggestiveness of the play. Therefore transition from the real-
ity actually grasped from sensory information to the represented 
reality is made possible owing to the potency of the phrasing and 
acting, promoted by the stage director’s artistic concept and envi-
sioning of the drama. In his Poetics, Aristotle emphasized the key 
function of both writing and staging, and the distinction between 
theater and narrative; “tragedy, is an imitation of an action that is 
serious, complete, and of a certain magnitude; in language embellished 
with each kind of artistic ornament, the several kinds being found 
in separate parts of the play; in the form of action, not of narrative” 
(Aristotle, 350 B.C.E). Another essential component, which may 
assist in the shift from actual reality to fiction in live theater deals 
with the suspension of disbelief based on the agreement by the 
spectators to provisionally suspend their judgment. According to 
Coleridge (1817) who coined the notion to support non-realistic 
elements in literature, the “willing suspension of disbelief” neces-
sitates “to transfer from our inward nature a human interest and a 
semblance of truth” to enjoy a fantastic story.
The ability for a spectator of live theater to enter a fictional 
reality would therefore imply, first a readiness to sacrifice realism, 
even logic and believability, and second a capacity to “contextualize” 
immediate sensory information processing. The first condition is 
a matter of culture. Like more recent forms of live arts, i.e., hap-
penings or visual performing arts, theater is a time-based form of 
IntroductIon
According to Aristotle, theater results from a human disposition 
for storytelling and imitation, “one instinct of our (human) nature” 
(Aristotle, 350 B.C.E). Acting out stories in front of an audience 
has remained popular, whatever the cultural context, despite the 
tremendous  technological  developments  intervened  since  the 
invention of motion picture, or video. These media display a fac-
simile of the real world on a fixed physically constrained space, 
i.e., the screen. The performance displayed is actually over by the 
time it is available to be viewed, and it may be watched anywhere, 
anytime. It is definitively “only a frame and a series of individual 
images” (Godard, 1999) of which the illusion of motion, and con-
sequently of life, results from the effect of persistence of vision in 
the viewer.
By contrast, in live theater, the perceptual inputs, are not pictures 
but real-time “imitations”, designed to represent on the spot some-
thing else: a real, live actor, is a character as well, four boards and a 
chair on stage become in the viewers’ mind the court of Elsinore. 
Hence, theater may be said to exhibit simultaneously two realities, 
one “actual”, related to the performance itself, the other “fictional”, 
suggested by the performance. In live theater, actors perform in the 
flesh, so that at any moment the audience faces both the perform-
ers and the characters they pretend to be. Besides, at any time, the 
performance may evolve as a function of the actors’ relationship 
with the audience, and the spectators may flip from the actual 
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art. It originates from the simultaneous exhibition of two facets 
of objects, movements, persons, and words. The actor/character 
duality exemplifies the “dual reality” inherent in live theater. As 
Artaud (1938) put it, reality is a matter of consensus, the one a 
theatergoer accepts when watching a play and, for a time, pre-
tends that what he is seeing is real. As to the second condition, it 
would rely on particular mental processes enabling spectators to 
go beyond what perceptual inputs tell them about the actual real-
ity, and thus “adhere” to the fictional reality. The paradox of being 
moved by what we know to be representations of events that are 
not really happening, central in esthetics, has been disputed by 
philosophers (Schaper, 1978; Rosebury, 1979). They argued about 
the “suspension of disbelief” hypothesis, distinguishing two kinds 
of beliefs; the beliefs entailed by the knowledge that the play is an 
intentionally made human artifact, and the beliefs relevant to what 
is going on in the fiction. In other words, when we attend a play 
we know that the question of the existence of the characters and 
events does not arise, and beliefs based on this knowledge have 
to be suspended so that they do not contradict our beliefs in the 
fiction. The combination of these two conditions raises the issue 
of the cognitive processes governing access to a fictional reality in 
live theater, and of their cerebral underpinning.
At first glance, the principal cognitive process involved when 
attending a dramatic play could come close to that at work dur-
ing reading or listening comprehension of a narrative. However, 
while narrative comprehension requires from readers or listen-
ers coherent representations of the characters, places, and events 
recounted in the text, the understanding of a performance assumes 
that one agrees that the actual facts, i.e., actors, scenery, and events 
are intended to depict a fiction. Accordingly, adhesion to the rep-
resented  reality,  i.e.,  fiction,  would  rather  involve  a  change  of 
perspective in sensory input processing. Indeed, in opposition to 
story readers or listeners, drama viewers instead of being urged to 
generate representations of the different narrative components, 
are invited to perceive the intended meaning of the performance 
and accordingly to cross the “fourth wall”, the invisible wall at the 
front of the stage, to enter in or adhere to the world of the play, 
that is the fiction.
One cognitive process potentially involved in this phenomenon 
would resemble the processing of metaphor, a rhetorical device 
through which the sense of a word is transferred into a new sense. 
As it happens, actions performed by actors on stage, as well as pieces 
of the scenery, are intended to represent a reality other than that 
which originates from the actual sensitive inputs. In this regard, 
the style of writing and the artistic vision governing the staging of 
a play are of paramount importance.
Another psychological construct possibly at work when view-
ing a dramatic play could relate to empathy, through which view-
ers adopt someone else’s perspective (Batson et al., 1997). Indeed 
spectators are prone to understand and even sympathize with the 
physical or affective experience of the characters, distinct from the 
actors whom they are actually facing. Such a shift in perspective 
could also be one of the cognitive processes allowing spectators to 
bypass physical reality and adhere to fiction.
The few studies having examined how the brain distinguishes 
reality from fiction were based on monitoring tasks in which the 
subjects had either to discriminate fiction generated from internal 
cognitive functions such as thought or imagination, from infor-
mation derived from the outside world by perceptual processing 
(Simons et al., 2008), either to evaluate reality-based scenarios 
involving real or fictional characters (Abraham et al., 2008) or to 
distinguish perceived and imagined events (Turner et al., 2008). 
Besides purely fiction-related aspects, studying adhesion to the 
fiction represented by a theatrical play must take into account the 
fact that it is in essence a subjective phenomenon, which occurs at 
variable moments depending on the disposition of each spectator 
in conjunction with the impact of theatrical events. Owing to the 
importance of subjectivity inherent in this peculiar phenomenon 
unique to theater, in order to study it, it is mandatory to identify 
and isolate the instants when the spectators enter the fictional 
world that lies beyond what their senses perceive. One way to 
identify these fugitive instants of adhesion to fiction may be to 
discern the moments when the spectators’ mind meets with the 
intentions of the playwright or stage director. This implies to 
analyze the personal feelings of each spectator throughout the 
dramatic performance and see how they tally with the theatrical 
events related to the intentions of the author, which may be spot-
ted in the text, and reinforced by particular direction markers. 
Whereas such theatrical events may easily be determined from the 
stage director prior to the performance, the spectators’ feelings are 
totally inherent in their personal experience. New methodologi-
cal approaches have recently been proposed to investigate phe-
nomenal consciousness from a first-person perspective (Varela, 
1996; Varela and Shear, 1999). For example, the verbal reports of 
subjects describing subtle changes in mental states during their 
involvement in an experiment may be integrated with the quanti-
tative analysis of neural activity and serve to detect and interpret 
neural processes (Lutz et al., 2002; Northoff and Heinzel, 2006). 
Such a method, based on the subjects’ verbal reports of their 
interpretations and feelings throughout the whole experiment 
seemed appropriate to seize changes in mental states induced by 
the ongoing performance, and particularly to determine for each 
spectator the instants when (s)he adhered to the fiction, with 
a view to analyze the corresponding neural correlates. Besides 
the phenomenological approach of mental states throughout a 
given experiment, another challenging issue was the determina-
tion of neural substrates within a realistic context. Innovative 
approaches to analyzing functional magnetic resonance imag-
ing (fMRI) data collected during dynamic naturalistic tasks have 
been adopted in recent studies for different purposes: to identify 
brain regions involved in the perception of personally meaningful 
event-boundaries during the free viewing of movie clips of ordi-
nary daily events (Zacks et al., 2001), to probe functional brain 
specialization for visual attributes in natural complex situations 
such as movie viewing (Bartels and Zeki, 2004), to investigate 
the neural correlates of spontaneous thoughts during ongoing 
real-world tasks (Spiers and Maguire, 2006) or of reciprocity in 
social interaction on the basis of online measurement of subjects’ 
gaze behavior (Wilms et al., 2010).
Investigating the neural correlates of adhesion, i.e., of the view-
ers’ shift from actual reality to that assumed to be conveyed through 
the dramatic performance in the flesh of an actor, required first the 
setting up of an original fMRI experiment, and second the use of 
a specific methodology for data analysis.Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  August 2010  | Volume 4  | Article 59  |  3
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The fMRI experiment aimed at recreating, within the laboratory, 
a valid ecological design of this complex social interaction, based 
on the unique relationship between actor and spectator, which 
typically occurs through the invisible “fourth wall” of the stage.
To pick out, within the brain activity elicited by watching the 
actor’s performance, transient signal changes relevant to the adhe-
sion of each spectator, we used an analytical method associating 
first-person data collected a posteriori, with specifications about the 
theatrical events defined a priori by the stage director. With the aim 
of tracking down possible physiological correlates, such as instant 
changes in dynamic heart rate variability (HRV) time-locked to the 
shift in the spectators’ mind from reality to fiction, an electrocar-
diogram (ECG) was recorded throughout the experiment.
We anticipated that as a form of storytelling, live theater would 
activate in the drama viewer’s brain regions typically engaged in 
the comprehension of narratives, e.g., the medial prefrontal cortex 
(mPFC), the precuneus–posterior cingulate cortices (PCC), the 
anterior temporal lobes, and areas along the middle and superior 
temporal gyri and the inferior frontal cortex, with the involvement 
of the right hemisphere (Xu et al., 2005; Ferstl et al., 2008; Yarkoni 
et al., 2008). With respect to activation specifically associated with 
adhesion, we hypothesized that it would recruit brain areas such 
as the left lateral inferior frontal gyrus (IFG; Rapp et al., 2004) 
involved in metaphor processing (i.e., whereby the sense of words 
or actions would be shifted into a new sense, related to the fic-
tion), and/or regions in the posterior temporal parietal region 
(Gallagher et al., 2000; Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003; Vollm et al., 
2006) involved in thinking about others thinking, or in adopt-
ing someone else’s perspective (allowing the spectator to regard 
a fiction as reality).
Processing the actions and scenery as metaphors could be one 
cognitive process related to the knowledge that a play is an inten-
tionally made human artifact, allowing to deal with a fiction as 
reality and as a consequence to consider a character as “the other”, 
by whom one may be moved. In order to complement the phenom-
enological account of adhesion, we expected to find in the ECG 




Nineteen volunteers (mean age 21, range 19–32, 10 females) joined 
the study. They were students of Humanities or Arts. Thirteen stud-
ied drama, the others were theatergoers. They were right-handed 
according to the Edinburgh handedness inventory (Oldfield, 1971). 
They had no visual or auditory impairment and no history of 
neurological or psychiatric disorder, or of neuro- or psychotropic 
drug consumption. The volunteers were first allowed to acquaint 
themselves with the MRI scanner environment, during a session 
when they tried and lay within the scanner, and were explained 
the objective and conditions of the experiment. The participants 
subsequently gave their written informed consent before taking part 
in the study, which was approved by the local ethical committee 
(CPP EST IV). One participant, unable to hear the play during the 
fMRI scanning, two with disturbed ECG recording and five others 
with fMRI acquisition disturbances (i.e., head movements) were 
not considered for data analysis.
exPerIMental fMrI desIgn
For each participant, the fMRI session was carried-out while an 
actor gave an 11- to 14-min live performance, videotaped for 
subsequent analysis. The play, a monolog, was excerpted from a 
contemporary dramatic poem “Onysos the furious”, in which old 
Onysos recounts his tumultuous epic (Gaudé, 2000). The noise 
and bore of the scanner were part of the staging, and meant to 
materialize a subway platform where the fiction was supposed to 
take place. In order to recreate a sense of dual reality and encourage 
the involvement of the subject in the fictional reality, the perform-
ance was made to begin as soon as (s)he entered the MRI scanner 
room. The actor, at the time physically present in the same room, 
delivered an introductory declamation as the participant was being 
prepared. Preparation consisted in positioning ECG electrodes, and 
adjusting headphones and prismatic goggles. As soon as these were 
on, the actor continued his performance, where he could be seen 
through the goggles, even as the scanner bed was made to slide into 
the magnet. The remainder of the play was performed in an adja-
cent room, owing to technical and safety considerations. From the 
moment the actor left the scanner environment, his performance 
was projected in real time to the subject who perceived the play 
through the goggles. The subject heard the performer’s monolog 
through headphones, the noise of the scanner being “staged” as 
part of the production. The subway platform where the drama was 
to take place was materialized as the continuation of the scanner 
head coil.
defInItIon of theatrIcal and subjectIve events vs baselIne
The stage director determined a priori within the written excerpt 
of the play a set of 24 textual and direction markers, committed 
to paper as a list of instructions to the actor and technical team 
(movements, positions, or tones of the actor, sound, lighting and 
scenery effects). These were the main staging events intended to 
prompt the adhesion of the spectator to the theatrical reality, and 
as such were assumed to have the power to induce a shift in the 
subject-spectator’s perception of reality, from the physical reality 
to the fictional reality of the play. These events, referred to as the-
atrical events and categorized as “textual” or “direction-related”, 
were synchronized subsequently with fMRI and ECG data acquired 
during the performance viewed by each subject, and reported on a 
timesheet per 5-s slots. With respect to the play actually performed 
to each participant, there were 23 ± 1 theatrical events, occurring in 
isolation or in a series, the duration of which varied within and/or 
between performances, spanning 1 to 4 ± 0.5 5-s slots.
A second category of event, referred to as “subjective” events, 
was used for analysis purposes, and determined as follows:
Immediately after the scanning session, without prior knowledge 
of it, the subjects were led into a different room where the video 
of the performance they had just been watching was replayed. The 
subjects were invited to describe, at their own pace, their thoughts 
and feelings step-by-step. When necessary and upon the subject’s 
request, the video was paused and rewound by the interviewer. 
The subject’s report was also transcribed onto the timesheet for 
every 5-s period of the videotaped play, to be synchronized with 
the fMRI and ECG data and the theatrical events. From the detailed 
accounts of their thoughts and feelings during the play it became 
possible to pick-up, for each spectator, the instants of adhesion to Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  August 2010  | Volume 4  | Article 59  |  4
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co-ordinates, and smoothed spatially with an 8-mm full-width 
  half-maximum (FWHM) Gaussian kernel. Low-frequency drifts 
were removed using a high-pass temporal filter (128 s).
To discern additional brain areas or those with a level of acti-
vation exceeding that associated with the basic processing of the 
actor’s movements and speech or changes in the scenery, periods 
of drama-watching devoid of theatrical and/or subjective events 
during which the spectators were assumed to simply watch the play, 
were used as the baseline condition. In this way, an individual fMRI 
time-series was specified for each subject, to distinguish active 
periods with events of interest (theatrical or theatrical + subjec-
tive) from baseline periods. The hemodynamic response to active 
periods was modeled as a box-car function over a 20-s period 
subsequent to the onset of initial theatrical events. The period 
was set at 20 s (corresponding to eight fMRI volumes) in order 
to accommodate the longest series of theatrical and subjective 
events. Active periods alternated with 14 ± 2-s baseline periods. 
The BOLD signal corresponding to each active period was modeled 
using a canonical hemodynamic response function and its tempo-
ral derivative. This analysis was performed individually for each 
participant. Differences between active and baseline periods were 
assessed using the general linear model, yielding t-statistics for each 
voxel. The contrast images of each participant were subsequently 
entered without filtering in a second-level whole-brain analysis 
(random-effect), in order to allow generalization by accounting 
for inter-subject variance. All reported areas of activation were 
significant using a p < 0.001 uncorrected at the voxel level and a 
p < 10−4 corrected at the cluster level, with a spatial extent threshold 
of 50 voxels. The anatomical localization of the local maxima and 
clusters was assessed with reference to the Montreal Neurological 
Institute (MNI) space.
Considering the variable, and for some participants limited, 
number of subjective events co-occurring with theatrical events 
meant to denote the subject’s adhesion to fiction, subjective events 
were investigated using a region of interest (ROI) analysis. The ROIs 
were chosen according to our afore-mentioned hypotheses about 
the cognitive processes potentially involved in the phenomenon 
of adhesion to fiction while watching live theater. Consequently, 
six ROIs consistent with regions shown in previous neuroimaging 
studies to be involved in the theory of mind (Gallagher et al., 2000; 
Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003), empathy (Carr et al., 2003; Vollm et al., 
2006), metaphor processing (Rapp et al., 2004; Eviatar and Just, 
2006), and story processing (Xu et al., 2005; Yarkoni et al., 2008) 
were delineated within the neural network activated by the theatri-
cal events evidenced from the whole-brain random analysis. The 
ROIs were defined, using the MRIcro software (Rorden and Brett, 
2000), as 5-mm spheres centered on the maximum activation peak 
(in MNI co-ordinates) determined from the second-level analysis 
in the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) and posterior superior tem-
poral sulcus (pSTS) bilaterally, in the right middle temporal gyrus 
(MTG) and left ventral IFG.
We estimated the strength and direction of the relationship 
between the subjects’ degree of adhesion to the fiction – rated as a 
function of the number of subjective events co-occurring with the-
atrical events – and the corrected BOLD signal in response to active 
periods contrasted against the baseline using a correlation analysis. 
To this purpose the mean contrast of each ROI was   computed for 
the theatrical reality while they had been watching the play in the 
scanner. Thorough reports enabled to specify for each spectator 
the onset and duration of thoughts and feelings related to possible 
shifts from one reality to the other. After having commented the 
whole play, the subjects answered a list of 12 questions about their 
involvement in the experiment, three of which being related to their 
adhesion to fiction, i.e., (1) Did you disregard the experimental 
environment? When? Specify as exactly as possible the moments. 
(2) Did you feel transported in another world? When? Specify as 
exactly as possible the moments. (3) Did you believe facing Onysos 
but not the actor? When? Specify as exactly as possible?
A single neutral evaluator, who had no information about the 
subject/spectator picked out from the comments of each subject 
those related to thoughts, feelings or opinions about the fiction – 
e.g., troubled by the atrocity of episodes of Onysos’ life, the violence 
of his vengeance, the intensity of his fury, fascinated by the magic of 
the dance around the fire, satisfied with Onysos’ contentedness, etc. 
The set of events selected by the evaluator was then confronted with 
the participant’s responses to the three above-mentioned questions. 
Out of the selected events those associated with moments specified 
by the subject in response to at least one of the three questions were 
validated as “subjective” events and dated according to the time 
code of the video. This definition allowed to estimate the extent 
to which the moments associated with adhesion to the fictional 
reality tallied with the predefined theatrical events, and allowed to 
specify the kind of subjective feelings associated.
Periods encompassing theatrical events with or without subjec-
tive events were considered as “active periods”. The onset of an active 
period for fMRI analysis was systematically set to coincide with the 
onset of the initial theatrical event of a series of one (isolated) or 
several (successive) events. Within an active period, theatrical and 
subjective events did or did not co-occur (i.e., occur within the 
same 5-s slot). Only co-occurring theatrical and subjective events 
were considered to denote adhesion.
The time intervals without predetermined theatrical events or 
reported judgments or opinions about the fiction specified as sub-
jective events, were used as the baseline condition, associated with 
more basic processing of visual and auditory stimulation.
fMrI data acquIsItIon and analysIs
Images were acquired on a 2-Tesla S200 Bruker MRI system 
(Bruker Medical GMBH, Ettlingen, Germany), equipped with 
an SK330 insert gradient coil (30 mT/m, 150 μs rise time) and a 
head volume RF coil. Functional images with blood oxygen level-
dependent (BOLD) contrast were obtained using an echo planar 
imaging (EPI) sequence and an intercommissural AC–PC slice 
orientation (32 interleaved slices; matrix size = 64 × 64 pixels; 
voxel size = 4 mm × 4 mm × 4 mm; TE = 43 ms, FOV = 256 mm, 
Flip  angle  =  90°).  TR  (repetition  time)  was  set  to  2.5  s.  A 
total of 323 ± 17 volumes were acquired over the duration of 
the performance.
The data were analyzed using Statistical Parametric Mapping 5 
software (SPM5, Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, 
London, UK; Friston et al., 2007) implemented in Matlab V6.1 
(Mathworks, Sherborn, MA, USA). The first three volumes used to 
reach signal equilibrium were discarded. EPI images were corrected 
for motion and repositioning, spatially normalized into standard Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  August 2010  | Volume 4  | Article 59  |  5
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team. At the individual level, the number of co-occurring subjective 
and theatrical events was used as an estimate of the degree to which 
each spectator’s subjective feelings conformed to the predefined 
theatrical events.
The  specification  of  the  spectators’  reports  showed  that 
thoughts and feelings relating to their adhesion to the theatrical 
reality denoted predominantly empathy, broadly defined as the 
understanding of another person’s feelings (Preston and de Waal, 
2002), the attribution of mental states to the character (but not to 
the actor), and metaphor processing, as phrases or gestures were 
processed with reference to their significance in the represented, 
fictional reality.
functIonal MagnetIc resonance IMagIng
The brain areas with significant activation associated with theatrical 
events, in contrast to baseline activity, are listed in Table 1.
Activation in the temporal lobe evoked by theatrical events was 
of greater intensity and extent in the right hemisphere, where it 
extended from the posterior temporal cortex to the anterior MTG 
(BA 21/22/40). In both hemispheres, posterior temporal activa-
tion encompassed the TPJ, and the pSTS. In the left hemisphere, 
the main focus of activation involved the ventral part of the IFG 
(BA47), the pars orbitalis, besides posterior temporal activation 
(BA 40/39/37).
The correlation analyses between the mean activation contrast in 
response to theatrical events within each ROI and the subjects’ rate 
of adhesion to the fiction showed a significant positive correlation in 
only two ROIs in the left hemisphere (Figure 1). In the left ventral IFG 
(−52, 34, −10), the activation contrast correlated with the number of 
each subject using the Marsbar toolbox (Brett et al., 2002) and then 
entered into a correlation analysis with the number of co-occurring 
theatrical and subjective events.
ecg recordIngs and data ProcessIng
In order to look for possible changes in dynamic HRV associated 
with the occurrence of theatrical and/or subjective events, the ECG 
was recorded simultaneously with the fMRI images. ECG data were 
recorded  using  an  MR-compatible  system  (EMR10:  Schwarzer, 
Munich, Germany) equipped with a digital signal processor board 
receiving a separately amplified ECG channel (Physiogard, Bruker 
SARL, Wissembourg, France), and a trigger input from the scanner 
to detect MRI volumes and synchronize ECG and fMRI data. The 
ECG signals were sampled at 1 kHz and transmitted via optical 
fibers to a standard PC. The 11 participants included in the analy-
sis had a clean ECG recording, which was processed offline using 
Matlab V6.1 (Mathworks, Inc.). The pulses of the rising phase of 
each R wave were detected and computed. The R-R intervals were 
calculated with an accuracy of ± 1 ms. Each R-R interval was plotted 
against the previous R-R interval to produce Poincaré plots in 30-s 
windows. The R-R means and inter-beat autocorrelation coefficients 
of ECG R-R intervals (rRR) [i.e., Pearson’s correlation coefficient 
between R-R(n) and R-R(n + 1)], obtained from Poincaré plots 
were computed over 30-s periods synchronized with the fMRI scans 
(12 × 2.5-s scans). The Poincaré plots spread along the diagonal 
line. This non-linear method provides a tool to quantify the sym-
pathetic/parasympathetic balance in the autonomic nervous system, 
where decrease in rRR denotes predominant vagal influence. To 
grasp changes in dynamic HRV time-locked to the occurrence of 
theatrical and subjective events, HRV statistics were computed for 
each subject over 30-s windows, made to shift by 5-s steps (twice 
the fMRI repetition time), throughout the play. For each subject, 
the R-R means and rRR coefficients were analyzed relative to the 
occurrence of (1) initial theatrical events determining the onset of 
active periods and (2) all recorded subjective events. Prior to the 
onset of each initial theatrical and all subjective event, a 30-s window 
(considered as the HRV baseline) was defined, and made to slide by 
5-s shifts to encompass the dynamic HRV at their onset.
results
subjectIve events
The thoughts and feelings reported by the participants were, above 
all, about the character and the intensity of his torment and distress, 
as opposed to the actor or the rendering of the drama. The rare 
instances where comments referred to the performer dealt with spe-
cific details in the actual performance, for example, a conspicuous 
yet totally unintentional drop of a prop by the actor, during one of 
the performances. This particular instance would illustrate a shift in 
the spectator’s mind from fiction to ongoing actual events, which 
the subject spontaneously identified as a non-theatrical event.
The analysis of verbal reports identified a mean of 16 ± 7 subjec-
tive events per subject, 69% of which were found to co-occur with 
the predefined theatrical events. This percentage was different from 
chance (at p < 0.026). With respect to the kind of theatrical events, 
40% of subjective events matched with textual theatrical events, and 
60% with direction-related markers unambiguously defined in the 
list of instructions provided by the stage director to the theatrical 
Table 1 | Brain regions significantly activated in response to theatrical 
events relative to the baseline.
Brain regions activated  Cluster  Z  Co-ordinates 
by theatrical events  size    (mm)
      x  y  z
R middle temporal gyrus (BA 21)  3352  5.20  50  −28  −12
R superior temporal gyrus (BA 22)    5.09  64  −54  12
R supramarginal gyrus (BA 40)    4.88  62  −42  26
L inferior frontal gyrus (BA 47)  1235  4.97  −52  34  −10
L inferior frontal gyrus (BA 47)    4.33  −26  24  −22
L inferior frontal gyrus (BA 47)    4.10  −48  20  2
L supramarginal gyrus (BA 40)  641  4.51  −62  −46  30
L inferior temporal gyrus (BA 37 )    4.06  −58  −66  2
L superior temporal gyrus (BA 39)    4.01  −62  −56  24
R caudate tail  219  3.77  34  −16  −8
R putamen    3.65  30  −20  2
R claustrum    3.56  32  4  −2
Activation  in  the  reported  cerebral  regions  was  significant  at  p  <  0.001 
uncorrected at the voxel level. It was significant at p < 0.0001 (except for the 
caudate cluster, p < 0.005) when corrected for multiple comparisons at the 
cluster level. L, left; R, right; BA, Brodmann’s areas; Z, statistics at the voxel 
level; x, y, z, MNI co-ordinates of the local maxima of the cluster. The anatomical 
labels of the activation foci were retrieved using the Automated Talairach atlas 
labeling system (Lancaster et al., 2000).The co-ordinates in bold figures were 
used as the center of the 5 mm-spheres for the ROI analysis.Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  August 2010  | Volume 4  | Article 59  |  6
Metz-Lutz et al.  Adhesion to theatrical fiction
dIscussIon
This study intended to capture online the neural correlates of the 
viewers’ shift from actual to fictional reality during live drama, 
referred to as adhesion. Using a first-person methodology and an 
ecological design we aimed at identifying instants when specta-
tors adhered to the reality represented in the play that was being 
acted out. Concomitant physiological recordings were intended to 
complement individual phenomenological accounts.
In each spectator, the instants when the fiction represented by the 
performance acted as reality have been identified from their indi-
vidual verbal reports. A large proportion of these moments, we called 
“adhesion” to fiction, co-occurred with the theatrical events specified 
by the stage director prior to the performance. As the spectators were 
not aware of these theatrical events and, a fortiori, of the intentions 
of the stage director and/or the performer, such results would denote 
the key function of both phrasing and staging in inducing belief in 
a reality other than that inherent in the actual perceptual inputs. 
These instants were found to be associated with a significant transient 
subjective reports associated with text- and stage direction-related 
theatrical events (r = 0.59, p < 0.05). In the left pSTS (−58, −66, 2) 
the mean contrast correlated significantly with the rate of subjective 
reports co-occurring with theatrical events based on stage directions 
only [i.e., striking lighting effects, etc…, (r = 0.54, p < 0.05)].
dynaMIc heart rate varIabIlIty
Figure 2 illustrates the method used to analyze the dynamic HRV 
response relative to the occurrence of events of interest. The analy-
sis of variance (ANOVA), assessing the subjects’ dynamic HRV 
response time-locked to the occurrence of initial theatrical events 
establishing the onset of the active periods of the individual fMRI 
time-series, revealed a significant decrease in rRR mean values at 
the onset of initial theatrical events [F(1,11) = 5.94, p < 0.033]. 
The decrease was more significant at the onset of subjective events 
[F(1,11) = 10.48, p < 0.0079]. With respect to R-R mean values, 
only a small but significant increase at the occurrence of subjective 
events was found [F(1,11) = 12.14, p < 0.005].
FIguRe 1 | Brain areas (in red) with significant BOLD signal differences 
when contrasting periods of the play with and without theatrical events. 
The activated clusters are significant at p < 0.0001, corrected (cf. Table 1). 
Correlation analyses between the subjective events in agreement with theatrical 
events (assumed to reflect adhesion to the theatrical reality) and the mean 
signal changes (in arbitrary units) were computed for each subject in the six 
regions of interest circumscribed by black circles. Encapsulated figures: A 
significant positive correlation between activation in response to theatrical 
events and the adhesion rate was only found in the left anterior IFG for 
subjective responses related to both text- and direction-related markers, and in 
the left pSTS for subjective responses related to direction markers. The 
co-ordinates in brackets are those of the ROI center.Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  August 2010  | Volume 4  | Article 59  |  7
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In the left ventral IFG, the peak voxel (−52, 34, −10) of the ROI 
the activation of which correlated with the amount of subjective 
events matching with both text- and direction-related theatrical 
events, closely fitted the co-ordinates (−50, 37, −12) of the anterior 
part of the left ventral IFG, known to play a key role in the process of 
understanding metaphors (Rapp et al., 2004). Activation in the ven-
tral IFG (BA 45/47) has also been reported in evaluative judgment 
in social and esthetic domains (Zysset et al., 2002; Cunningham 
et al., 2003; Jacobsen et al., 2006). In good-bad evaluative judg-
ments, Cunningham et al. (2003) observed increased ventrolateral 
prefrontal activity in judgments marked by greater ambivalence. 
As for social appraisal, esthetic judgments also specifically activate 
the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (BA 45/47), part of a set of areas 
comprising the anterior frontomedian cortex and the precuneus 
(Jacobsen et al., 2006). Increased activation in BA 45/47 as a func-
tion of stimulus complexity specific to esthetic judgment observed 
in the Jacobsen’s study suggests that this area plays a specific role in 
evaluative assessments according to the person’s value system. In 
the present study, the positive correlation between activation in 
BA45/47 and the number of subjective events co-occurring with 
theatrical events related to both textual and direction markers 
might suggest some kind of esthetic judgment about both the 
writing and the artistic conception of the play. With reference to 
the   philosophical debate about the “suspension of disbelief”, the 
decrease in dynamic HRV. In the brain activation pattern elicited 
by the predefined theatrical events designed by the stage director 
to prompt the adhesion of the spectators, the signal changes in two 
regions, in the left ventral IFG (BA 47) and pSTS positively correlated 
with the degree of adhesion of the spectators, induced by these events. 
More specifically, activation in the left IFG correlated significantly 
with the degree of adhesion prompted by theatrical events based on 
both text and staging, whereas in the left pSTS, it correlated with the 
theatrical events based on stage direction only.
adhesIon to fIctIon dePends on both verbal and  
socIal ProcessIng
The left ventral IFG and left pSTS, known to be part of the language 
network, have been shown to be involved in context-relevant verbal 
processing, namely in text comprehension (Xu et al., 2005). In a 
recent meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies on text comprehen-
sion, these two regions have been found to form a sub-network 
within the “extended language network” (Ferstl et al., 2008). Their 
involvement in the process of adhesion to live dramatic fiction 
might suggest that entering the reality represented in a play, essen-
tially relies, at least in part, on verbal processing. However, these 
two areas have more recently been shown to be involved in social 
cognition, i.e., understanding others and one’s self, and processes 
at the interface between the self and others.
FIguRe 2 | Forty-second excerpts of Poincaré plots depicting, in three 
participants, the dynamic HRV response associated to the occurrence of a 
theatrical (T) and/or a subjective (S) event. The upper line refers to the 
individual fMRI time-series alternating baseline periods (green) with an active 
period (red) time-locked to the initial theatrical event (T). The successive Poincaré 
plots were computed in 30-s windows by plotting each R-R interval against the 
previous one. The sequence was obtained by sliding each 30-s window by 5-s 
shifts, synchronized with every other fMRI repetition time (TR = 2.5 s) and with 
the subject’s timesheet reports. The successive plots present distinctive patterns 
as a function of the rRR value. The points spread out further along the diagonal in 
plots outside the active period, while they cluster together within the active 
period. The R-R autocorrelation coefficient (rRR), i.e., the correlation coefficient 
between R-R(n) and R-R(n + 1), was worked out in each window. The decrease in 
rRR denotes predominant vagal influence (Otzenberger et al., 1998). The brackets 
refer to statistical inferences, computed on rRR prior to and at the onset of 
events of interest [i.e., initial theatrical events and all subjective events (S)].Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  August 2010  | Volume 4  | Article 59  |  8
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processing across a variety of functional domains (Gusnard and 
Raichle, 2001; Northoff and Bermpohl, 2004; Northoff et al., 2006). 
A recent meta-analysis demonstrated that these structures over-
lapped with brain regions typically involved in cognitive social 
processes, namely involving self-other distinction and exchange 
(Schilbach et al., 2008). In narrative processing, the involvement of 
the dmPFC has been related to the decoding of the beliefs, feelings 
or intentions of agents (Vogeley et al., 2001) and the PCC to the 
linking of textual information with a subject’s knowledge about the 
real world; both processes are central to the construction of mental 
representations (Gallagher et al., 2000; Ferstl et al., 2005; Xu et al., 
2005; Wilson et al., 2008). Cavanna and Trimble (2006) suggested 
that these structures, also active during conscious resting state, were 
engaged in continuous information gathering and representation 
of the self and of the external world. Since the story is recounted 
in the form of action and therefore does not require the viewers to 
represent the situation, one may wonder whether representations 
of the self and the world are necessarily called for. In addition, the 
PCC have been shown to be involved with the medial prefrontal and 
lateral temporo-parietal cortices in assigning first-person perspec-
tive (Vogeley and Fink, 2003).
In the particular context of a live story being acted out, the 
absence of significant involvement of the midline structures may 
thus be interpreted in different ways. This may result from the 
fact that a story enacted may not, at least not to the same degree 
as processing a spoken or written story would, require the linking 
of incoming information with prior knowledge or experience to 
achieve coherence building (Ferstl and von Cramon, 2001) or to 
evaluate facts on the basis of personal experience (Zysset et al., 
2002). The absence of significant activation in these areas may 
also be considered in reference to their usual involvement in social 
cognition relying on self-referential information to interpret exter-
nal inputs, and in particular, others (Buckner and Carroll, 2007; 
Schilbach et al., 2008).
As during a performance, the spectators are enjoined to accept 
the represented situation as true, or in other words, to take the 
fictional world for granted in spite of the actual reality grasped 
through sensory information, it implies that the spectators, in a 
way, disengage or disconnect themselves from the immediate sig-
nificance of sensory information in order to process the constituent 
actions and events of a fiction. That being the case, one may wonder 
whether this could not be conditioned by the absence of activation 
in the midline cortical areas.
Is adhesIon to draMatIc fIctIon constraIned by susPended 
self-referentIal eMotIonal ProcessIng?
The theatrical events designed to prompt the adhesion of the spec-
tator were associated with a significant decrease in dynamic HRV, 
which was significantly more pronounced for subjective events. 
The ECG was recorded because we had expected to find instead 
an increase in dynamic HRV as a result of changes in emotional 
state putatively associated to the adhesion to a dramatic fiction. 
Indeed, emotional states typically increase the sympathetic activity, 
which in turn increases the dynamic HRV (McCraty et al., 1995). 
Consequently various psychological interventions, namely operant 
conditioning of heart rate (Hatch et al., 1990) and neutral hypno-
sis (DeBenedittis et al., 1994) have been proposed to decrease the 
involvement of the left ventral IFG could be viewed as underlying 
a mental process based on the knowledge that what is going on 
is an artifact intended to mean something else with subsequent 
metaphor processing gating the spectator’s adhesion to fiction. 
Alternatively the involvement of this cortical area could be related 
to the esthetic appreciation of the way the performance achieves the 
fiction, or to the evaluative judgment of the plot or character.
As regards the left pSTS, besides its critical role in the integra-
tion of different types of sensory information within and across 
modalities into a coherent percept (Beauchamp et al., 2004), its 
involvement in the passive viewing of eye, lip, face, hand, and 
body motion (Puce et al., 1998) has been shown to be sensitive 
to the context within which the biological motion is perceived. 
Several recent functional neuroimaging studies have provided clues 
hinting at its involvement in the interpretation of other people’s 
actions in relation to their intentions (Pelphrey et al., 2004; Vander 
Wyk et al., 2009). Its central role in social cognition was suggested 
by its involvement as a part of a distributed network selectively 
recruited when reasoning about the content of mental states of 
others (Martin and Weisberg, 2003; Saxe et al., 2004; Saxe, 2006). 
Indeed, tasks designed to investigate the theory of mind, based 
on false belief reasoning, have revealed a very consistent pattern 
of brain activation, including the mPFC, medial precuneus, and 
the TPJ, bilaterally. However, Saxe et al. (2006) observed a differ-
ential involvement of the medial and lateral parts of this network, 
depending on the task, showing that the two medial regions were 
recruited when the task implied judgments about other people, 
and that the temporo-parietal regions were recruited only when 
subjects thought about others’ thoughts. In the present experience, 
the positive correlation between activation in the pSTS and sub-
jective events co-occurring only with direction-related theatrical 
events could be in agreement with the involvement of this region 
in the interpretation of intended action. However, in the context of 
adhesion, the interpretation of action does not bear on the intention 
of the performer pretending to be and act as someone else, but on 
the intention of the characters within the fictional reality, which 
requires a shift in perspective.
lIve theater tells a story but In the forM of actIon
The left ventral IFG and left pSTS, activated in relation to the sub-
jects’ adhesion to fiction, were only part of the larger pattern of 
brain activation induced by the occurrence of theatrical events, 
which altogether included the left ventral part of the IFG (BA47), 
the pars orbitalis, and the posterior temporal area encompassing 
bilaterally the TPJ and the pSTS, although predominant in the right 
hemisphere where it extended to the anterior MTG (BA 21/22/40). 
All these regions are consistently engaged in text comprehension, 
together with the cortical midline structures [dorsomedial prefron-
tal cortex (dmPFC) and PCC]. As a form of storytelling based on 
the imitation of actions, in contrast to a spoken or written story, 
a dramatic performance does not call for coherence building or 
require the construction of dynamic representations of the situa-
tions reported, which have been shown to rely on the dmPFC (Xu 
et al., 2005; Yarkoni et al., 2008).
In addition to their involvement in narrative processing, these 
midline cortical structures, which are part of a consistent net-
work of brain activity “at rest”, are also engaged in self-referential Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  August 2010  | Volume 4  | Article 59  |  9
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HRV associated with the absence of significant activation in the 
precuneus would substantiate the hypothesis of a change in the state 
of consciousness of live drama viewers enabling them to adhere 
to the fiction.
This parallel lead us to hypothesize that, like hypnosis, viewing 
live drama induces a subtle alteration of consciousness allowing 
to dissociate components of behavior. The hypnotic state typically 
results from an induction procedure based on suggestions of relaxa-
tion or imaginative or ideational experience, during which critical 
judgment is suspended. As an outcome of the full involvement in 
such experience, the subject may experience changes in the percep-
tion of peripheral inputs, such as pain reduction. In live theater, the 
induction procedure that urges the spectators to divert their mind 
from incoming factual information and enter the dramatic fiction 
could be either the theatrical events, the plot or “arrangement of 
incidents” in Aristotle’s words (Aristotle, 350 B.C.E), or the “will-
ing suspension of disbelief” proposed by Coleridge. The ensuing 
suspension of self-reference and emotional processing could be 
one expression of the cathartic function of drama put forward by 
Aristotle, which is consubstantial with esthetic pleasure. “Catharsis 
can only happen to someone who in the presence of a work of art 
accepts the role of an esthetic spectator” (Schaper, 1968).
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dynamic HRV. A decrease in dynamic HRV similar to that reported 
for hypnotic states have been observed in meditation-based self-
regulatory management of emotion (Takahashi et al., 2005). From 
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of significant activation in the CMS, particularly in the precuneus, 
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view point of the observing self (Vogeley and Fink, 2003).
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Should there be a connection between alterations in the dynamic 
HRV and the absence of significant activation in the precuneus 
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